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This section is dedicated to the daily activities of the different SC D2 working bodies. A place to put, retrieve and store information related to the development of the work, maintains the contact details of members and invited experts and, in general, whatever use could be decided by each team.

A password is needed to access each Working Group, password that will be distributed by the Convener or Secretary of each entity.

Summary

D2.40 Cyber risks and cyber security for the next generation of digital systems in Electric Power Utilities

This WG follows the work delivered in 2014 by WG D2.31 (Security architecture principles for digital systems in Electric Power Utilities (EPUs)). WG D2.31 has clarified security architecture principles in 3 main areas: “Graded Security“ approach, modelling of cyber-attacks and remote services.

The focus of this new working group is to build on and deepen the conclusions made by WGD2.31. The scope of this work will cover the discussion of general security architecture principles for digital systems, but will mainly focus on upcoming application, connectivity and requirements of digital systems in EPUs and hence cover the evolving technology and continuous rise in the risk landscape.

D2.42 Synchronization and time distribution in communication networks for time-sensitive distributed operational applications in the power grid

Modern automation applications in the power system require accurate time coherence between the constituents of the system which are increasingly distributed across the grid and still need to operate synchronously as if they were concentrated at one point. The communication network is on the other hand increasingly migrating towards packet switched and store-and-forward operation, introducing uncertainty into the behavior of the data exchange. Achieving an adequate distribution of time information across the communication network without introducing an inappropriate absolute delay remains a major task in the design of telecommunication networks for operational usage.

This working group aims to assess time distribution and frequency synchronization requirements and solutions for synchronizing power system automation applications.

D2.43 Enabling software defined networking for EPU telecom applications

Consideration of Software Defined Network (SDN) is an extension to the growing adoption of virtualization within the EPU in solving new challenges such as distributed energy resources (DER) which benefit from an agile infrastructure and network.  

The IEEE P1915.1™ standard specifies security framework, models, analytics, and requirements for Software Defined Networking and Network Function Virtualization (SDN/NFV) and addresses security models, terminology, and analytics, essential components of SDN/NFV environments to ensure confidentiality, integrity and availability.  As utility interest in SDN/NFV technologies is growing, it will be very important for utilities to be aware of the cybersecurity implications of using these technologies.

Overall the scope of this working group is to produce a framework of guidelines for an EPU to tailor procurement, deployment, and management of SND/NFV technologies.

JWGD2/B2.39 "Design, deployment and maintenance of Optical Cables associated to Overhead HV Transmission Lines"

Optical cables associated to overhead HV transmission lines have become the main medium to support the telecommunications needs of HV Power utilities (Operation, Protections, Maintenance…).

The aim of this JWG is to produce practical guidelines according to the experience of different power utilities in the design and deployment of HV line optical cables and their maintenance.  These guidelines will focus on OPGW cables as well as on OPPC cables. 

JWGD2/C2.41 Advanced Utility Data Management and Analytics for Improved Situational Awareness of EPU Operations

The objective of this Working Group is to survey and examine current practices, industry trends, and new research on the use various data sources and applications to enhance situational awareness, as well as the data integration and management technologies to facilitate effective implementation in the control room

D2.44 Usage of public or private wireless communication infrastructures for monitoring and maintenance of grid assets and facilities

Wireless communication services delivered over either public or private infrastructures open the way for many new monitoring and maintenance applications in the power system. Large scale collection of non-time-critical data across the grid renders possible a more proactive approach to asset life-cycle management and to the monitoring and surveillance of technical sites. Field worker personal communication terminals may be used for local wireless connection to intelligent substation assets for identification, status collection, or local measurements. The field worker may connect to remote data servers for obtaining further information on the asset or on the larger system in order to undertake more appropriate actions. Still the same field worker may need technical support and more specific expertise, inside or outside the utility perimeter, and may hence connect through his terminal to central support platforms. Communication is a central issue in all these contexts: reachability with adequate throughput is the enabling factor for new operation processes in the asset maintenance and system monitoring paradigm.

D2.45 Impact of governance regulations and constraints on EPU sensitive data distribution and location of data storage

The scope of this working group is to produce guidelines for assessing the impact of governance regulations and constraints on EPU sensitive data distribution and location of storage.

D2.46 Cybersecurity: future threats and impact on Electric Power Utility organizations and operations

The cybersecurity threat landscape is rapidly evolving. EPUs need a prediction of the evolution of these threats, the corresponding changes to local laws and regulations, and the need for standardization. The planning horizon for these estimates should be divided between the near term (next 10 years) and the long term (next 20 years). The assessment of the impact should include recommended changes to EPU cybersecurity policies, procedures and organizational directives, and recommended solutions to improve the security posture of EPU organizations and operations.